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Opportunity without Organization: 
Labour Mobilization in Egypt after the 25th January Revolution1 
 
Christopher Barrie and Neil Ketchley2 
Abstract 
Prevailing understandings of labour protest and strikes take as their focus stable democratic 
settings where autonomous trade union structures are an established component of the 
organizational resources available to workers. We extend the analysis of labour mobilization to a 
radically different context: Egypt in the year of the 25th January Revolution, when workers 
mobilized en masse in the absence of union leadership. For this, we use a catalogue of 4,912 
protest events reported in Arabic-language newspapers. Our findings point to evidence of cross-
sectoral demonstration effects in contexts of political disorganization—local and national 
mobilization advancing both labour and non-labour demands is associated with subsequent 
labour protest. This speaks to the value of understanding labour protest and strikes not as 
delimited domains of action but ass parts of a wider universe of contentious politics. In addition, 
state-level signals of opportunity and shifts in economic conditions are also found to pattern the 
incidence of labour mobilization.   
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1 Introduction 
The Russian Revolution of 1905 would first alert contemporaries to the potential potency of the 
strike as a vehicle for social revolution. The mass strike, in such readings, was the “living pulse-
beat of the revolution” (Luxemburg 1906) and held out the potential for wholesale 
transformation of society. Yet despite the revolutionary origins of labour mobilization, the 
literature on the dynamics of labour protest has overwhelmingly focused on Western liberal-
democracies, where trade unions are an established component of the organizational landscape 
and labour activism is in historic decline (Biggs 2015). This ignores authoritarian contexts 
wherein workplaces retain a central position in the ecologies of contentious politics, but trade 
union organizations are hollowed out or intended as instruments for state control (Robertson 
2007, 2011). In consequence, we are rarely able to explain the dynamics of labour activism 
during transitions away from authoritarian rule, when workers mobilize in the absence of 
effective trade unions and clearly defined oppositional hierarchies (Beinin and Duboc 2013). 
In order to address this lacuna, we examine labour protest in Egypt between 2011 and 
2012. This period coincides with the 25th January Revolution, when mass street protests ousted 
President Hosni Mubarak. As several studies have chronicled, the post-Mubarak transition 
witnessed a sustained wave of labour mobilization that far outstripped levels of protest seen in 
the country’s modern history (see Sallam 2011; Beinin 2013; Beinin and Duboc 2013; Alexander 
and Bassiouny 2014). However, previous analysis has not accounted for variation in where and 
when labour protest occurred. Here, a close examination of the Egyptian case provides an 
opportunity to extend the literature on labour mobilization to a non-Western setting where union 
leadership is effectively absent, while also illuminating the dynamics of labour activism 
following a democratic breakthrough. 
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To conduct our analysis, we draw on a catalogue of 4,912 protest events derived from 
Arabic-language Egyptian newspapers. To account for the social contexts of mobilization, we 
locate protest events in their census district. The dependent variable is the number of participants 
in labour protest in a district week. A body of scholarship stresses the endogenous nature of 
strike waves, when workers take inspiration from the actions of others. We examine this by using 
spatially-weighted and temporally disaggregated event data to analyze the effects of proximate 
mobilization on subsequent labour protest. A dominant strand of the literature on labour activism 
points to changes in economic conditions, and so we also measure the effect of unemployment 
and food prices on protest participation. Finally, political process theories suggest that protestors 
mobilize and demobilize in response to signals of political opportunity, and this leads us to 
examine the effects of state repression and other public shifts in the regime’s stance to workers’ 
grievances. 
We find that districts experienced higher levels of labour activism following mobilization 
in neighbouring districts, which we interpret as evidence of demonstration effects. Importantly, 
demonstration effects came from both labour and non-labour protest, and these dissipated with 
distance. Demonstration effects are also detected at the national level: large and highly public 
protest in the iconic venue of Tahrir Square could stimulate labour mobilization elsewhere, while 
the repression of protest had a suppressant effect. Consistent with the expectations of the 
literature, there is also evidence for protest responding to state-level signals of political opening 
during the post-Mubarak transition. However, given the highly contentious and chaotic nature of 
the post-revolutionary transition, such signals were often contradictory: political opportunities 
had both a galvanizing and suppressant effect within a short time frame. We also show how, 
contrary to the expectations of the literature, rising food prices functioned to suppress protest. 
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Taken together, these findings deepen current understandings of the position of 
contentious collective action during episodes of democratization (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens 1992; Bermeo 1997; Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 2016, Kadivar and Caren 
2016) by unpacking a case in which massive labour protest nonetheless remained parochial, 
fragmented, and to a large degree sidelined from the unfolding political process (see also Ekiert 
and Kubik 1999; Robertson 2004). In Egypt, the hollowing out of trade union structures and 
other worker organizations under conditions of authoritarianism meant that workers principally 
took their cues from the actions of visible others. The absence of a centrally guiding hand 
ensured that workers mobilized in a piecemeal fashion, framing their demands in the context of 
their workplace and typically failing to coordinate their activism with other sectors and actors. 
Here, the role played by non-labour protest in inspiring labour activism holds out an implication 
of key importance for scholarship on labour and collective action more generally: in contexts of 
organizational weakness, labour protest and strikes should not be studied as a discrete domain of 
action but as elements of a wider set of “contentious forms” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
 
2. Labour mobilization in Egypt 
The sheer scale of labour protest witnessed in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak is all the more 
notable for the apparent lack of organizational resources available to Egyptian workers in the 
post-Mubarak transition. In what follows, a first section is devoted to the organizational 
composition of the labour movement in Egypt, while a second gives details of the role of labour 
in the 25th January Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath. 
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2.1 Egyptian Trade Union Federation  
The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was Egypt’s sole legal trade union organization at 
the time and had a pyramidal structure consisting of a national executive committee, 23 general 
unions for broad sectors of industry, and so-called ‘union committees’ at a workplace level. 
These unions were not representatives of workers’ interests, however. Under Mubarak, the 
ETUF had been “an arm of the regime” (Beinin and Duboc 2013: 207), and the unions 
comprised by the ETUF “played no collective bargaining role but were rather used as 
instruments for political control” (Bishara 2014: 2). The 23 general unions making up the ETUF 
had “full rights to conclude collective agreements, conduct collective-bargaining and manage the 
activities of the lower-level union committees” (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 132). 
Workplace union committees, the only body with a limited rank-and-file mandate, were not 
permitted to call strikes (ibid.: 140). Still, union committees, while often peopled by regime 
cronies, did occasionally rally behind workers. However, even if they supported strikes, these 
committees were “completely unable to mobilize any of the resources of the federation on their 
behalf” and organizers during Mubarak’s tenure were frequently subjected to punitive measures, 
including demotion and dismissal (ibid.: 139). 
Union committees within the ETUF structures were of two sorts – ‘professional 
committees’ (ligan mihniyya) and ‘workplace committees’ (ligan al-munshaat). Among the 3.8 
million workers considered members of the ETUF, around a third of these were organized into 
professional committees that were made up of workers employed in similar professions across 
large areas of Egypt and constituted little more than paper memberships (Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014: 144). Most significantly, available statistics indicate that in the period leading 
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up to the 25th January Revolution, the overwhelming majority of workplaces in Egypt lacked 
organization altogether. Out of 16,758 registered workplaces across all sectors (public, public-
business, and private), there are records of just 1,554 workplace committees, meaning that less 
than ten percent of workplaces could boast any official form of union organization at the 
beginning of Egypt’s parlous transition away from authoritarian rule (ibid.: 146). As Alexander 
and Bassiouny conclude, “[t]he absence of trade-union organization was therefore the rule and 
not the exception” (ibid.). 
 
2.2 Democratic breakthrough 
Despite a lack of independent trade unions, the years before the 25th January Revolution did see 
episodic mobilization by workers and public sector employees, which played out against a 
backdrop of intensifying anti-regime opposition (Gunning and Baron 2013). However, this 
would pale in comparison with the scale of mobilization that followed the events of January-
February 2011. Figure 1 shows the size and frequency of protest in the year before and after the 
25th January Revolution.1 As should be clear, the breakthrough in February 2011 unleashed an 
unprecedented wave of protest, as Egyptians of various political orientations and backgrounds 
sought redress for their grievances. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The role of organized labour in the eighteen days of mass protest that began on 25 
January 2011 and which led to Mubarak’s overthrow, is indicative of the energetic but frequently 
uncoordinated nature of labour mobilization in Egypt. In contrast to the situation in Tunisia 
where the national trade union federation played a crucial mobilizing role in the protests leading 
to Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s removal (Allal and Geisser 2011), the ETUF continued to pledge 
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their fealty to Mubarak. As a result, Egyptians participated first as citizens and only later as 
workers (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 193; Beinin 2016: 108). Worker protests would only 
really take off after 6 February 2011, following Mubarak’s decision to reopen public sector 
institutions, closed from 28 January to 5 February in response to escalating and increasingly 
unruly protest. From 7 February to 11 February, there were at least 113 labour protest events 
involving over 100,000 workers, with the mobilization reaching its zenith on Thursday 10 
February, the end of the Islamic working week and the day before Mubarak’s removal from 
office. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Interestingly, this surge in labour activism does not appear to have derived from a 
concerted effort on the part of organized labour movement to take the revolution to the 
workplace. Instead, most employees and workers advanced limited and parochial demands 
relating to wages, contracts, and management. Here, the upturn in labour protest is likely better 
explained as a response to the fracturing of the repressive state apparatus and the clear 
opportunity this presented for workers to make their own labour-specific claims (Ketchley 2017). 
Nonetheless, workers no doubt recognized the significance of their continued protest in the face 
of calls for calm, and there is some evidence that labour protests took up broader revolutionary 
demands (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 201). Still, measured in terms of participation, labour 
protest during this period constituted only a small fraction of Egyptians taking to the streets (see 
Figure 2). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Turning to the post-Mubarak transition, it is striking that the so-called ‘Eighteen Days’ 
was also the only time in 2011 that workers mobilized en masse simultaneously across sectors. In 
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the months that followed, while there were some isolated instances of national labour 
mobilization within sectors, workers’ collective action did not exhibit any significant cross-
regional and cross-sectoral coordination. This began to change towards the end of 2011, when 
episodes of labour protest began to take on national dimensions with greater frequency, notably 
in late-September and early-October, when teachers, postal workers, and junior doctors launched 
a series of protests and strikes (see Figure 3). Some of these, notably the teachers, had by that 
point organized into independent unions; a factor that may well have facilitated a greater degree 
of coordination (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 230-1). Still, of the 2,217 labour protest events 
recorded following Mubarak’s fall, just 351 showed signs of national coordination (16 per cent).2 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Nonetheless, the scale of mobilization in the period after Mubarak’s removal was 
massive (see Figure 4). Of the 4,912 protest events recorded in the event catalogue that we go on 
to analyze, labour protest events make up 2,361 (48 per cent). Comparing this figure to the 
frequency of labour actions during Mubarak’s tenure, the year following the 25th January 
Revolution witnessed an increase of nearly 5 times on the mean level of labour protest seen over 
the five years prior to 2011 (see Beinin and Duboc 2013). Out of these labour protest events, 646 
were strikes, representing an increase of nearly 6.5 times the average of the preceding five 
years.3 
For the purposes of our analysis, it is important to note that despite the prevalence of 
labour protest during this period, there were only some limited signs that labour was making 
gains in the post-revolutionary political process. One principal example came in early-March 
when Ahmad Hasan al-Bura’i—a long-time advocate of independent unions and professor of 
labour law—was installed as the new Minister of Manpower. On March 12, al-Bura’i made a 
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speech, widely reported by Egyptian news media, that trade unions would have the right of 
independent organization. The significance of such an announcement cannot be overstated. 
Egypt’s labour movement had been subject to ETUF control since 1957 and the move toward 
independent labour organization represented a new and revolutionary development. 
Just ten days later, however, on 24 March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF), who had taken interim control following Mubarak’s ouster, published a decree that 
introduced sanctions for anyone engaging in protest activity that “prevents, delays or disrupts the 
work of public institutions or public authorities” (cited in Beinin 2012: 9). Over the course of 
2011, workers were mobilizing despite near constant allegations from the SCAF and state news 
media that their demands were threatening the national economy (Sallam 2011). Political 
alliances were also hard to come by, with parties notionally supportive of workers’ interests 
giving their backing to anti-strike laws (Beinin 2012: 18). 
The most significant period of resurgent mobilization came in mid-November 2011, after 
the SCAF made a constitutional power-grab in an attempt to arrogate further power to itself in 
the run up to parliamentary elections. In response, mass protests were held in Tahrir Square on 
Friday 18 November. For the next week, in what became known as the ‘Events of Muhammad 
Mahmud Street’, running street battles were staged in Tahrir and its outskirts, with simultaneous 
protests taking place in numerous governorates across Egypt. This was “the most serious and 
sustained challenge to military rule following Mubarak’s ouster” and was faced down with 
brutal, and very public, repression (Ketchley 2017). However, during this same period, the 
ETUF, supported by the SCAF, was embroiled in an ultimately successful effort to force the 
removal of individuals sympathetic to independent unions (installed by al-Bura’i) from the 
ETUF executive. Al-Bura’i would later resign in protest. Following Muhammad Mahmud, the 
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most organized force in Egyptian politics—the Muslim Brothers—received assurances from the 
SCAF that a provisional timetable for the transfers of power to an elected government would be 
adhered to and publicly committed themselves to eschewing street-level mobilization in favour 
of electioneering (ibid.). The beginning of the elections period from 28 November onwards 
coincided with a large decrease in mobilization. The failure of the Muhammad Mahmud protests 
to achieve their aims and the shift in attention to mobilizing votes over protests coincided with a 
fall in protest activity. 
What is the overall picture of labour mobilization during this period? Labour protest, in 
the main, was parochial, sectoral, and labour-specific. In this, patterns of labour protest seem to 
mirror those that predominated in the pre-Mubarak era (Abdalla 2012: 3; Beinin and Duboc 
2013: 224), even if the scale of labour mobilization was far greater. In the absence of a nationally 
competent trade union structure, the labour movement had a hard task participating in the overall 
political process. Within electoral politics, labour had little voice, and any hope represented by 
the appointment of al-Bura’i was soon extinguished. A newly confident labour movement sought 
to loosen restrictions on union organization over the course of 2011 but such efforts were faced 
with countervailing pressures from the SCAF, and only really began to bear fruit towards the end 
of the year (Beinin 2013). Over the course of the year as whole, the broader tenor of the political 
process was characterized by an opposition to mobilization by workers that was denounced as 
special interest and a menace to the post-Mubarak transitional process. 
 
3 Theorizing labour mobilization 
If the conditions for Egyptian workers in the first year of the post-Mubarak transition were not 
particularly favourable, their continued mobilization presents us with a puzzle—why did workers 
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continue to mobilize and what was driving variation in the incidence of such protest? With that 
puzzle in mind, the next section surveys the literature on labour mobilization in an effort to 
elaborate a set of testable explanations for the trajectories of labour protest in Egypt in the 
aftermath of the 25th January Revolution. 
 
3.1 Demonstration effects 
An attention to demonstration effects is common to sociological analyses of strike waves. In 
their study of the spread of French coal mining strikes, Conell and Cohn (1995) make explicit the 
shared mechanisms shaping the diffusion of both social movements and labour action. The claim 
made in understandings such as these is that strikes can, in and of themselves, serve as signals 
and carriers of information, thereby enabling the proliferation and escalation of strike activity. 
Eschewing assumptions of perfect information as well as attempts to model information 
asymmetry, these authors contend that strikes always occur in conditions of uncertainty and that 
aggregate-level analyses neglect the endogenous and diachronic elements of workers’ collective 
action (Conell and Cohn 1995; Biggs 2003, 2005). Put simply, strikes stimulate other strikes and, 
in their capacity to catalyse further protest and diffuse more widely, can be understood in the 
same or similar terms as the diffusion of other forms of protest and more transgressive 
contention (e.g., Myers 1997; Andrews and Biggs 2006). Thus, echoing work in the social 
movements literature on the diffusion of successful protest tactics (Oberschall 1989; Soule 
1997), scholars have argued convincingly that the onset of a labour protest stimulates other 
workers to consider similar paths of action by providing them with information that conditions 
are favourable, thereby increasing the likelihood of a protest occurring elsewhere (Conell and 
Cohn 1995; Biggs 2003, 2005; Jansen, Sluiter, and Akkerman 2016). 
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Conceptualized in this way, we begin to see that strikes, and labour action more 
generally, might be understood as one part of a broader universe of "contentious forms" 
(McAdam et al. 2001). Indeed, the endogenous mechanisms of interaction and inspiration 
undergirding strike waves share more than a family resemblance to those observable in the 
waves or clusters of heightened contentious activity identified by social movement scholars 
(Oberschall 1989; Oliver and Myers 2003; Tarrow 2011). A key implication of this line of 
thinking is that contentious episodes such as strike waves need not be studied in isolation and 
that, during ‘waves’ or ‘cycles’ of sustained and widespread contention, labour action and strikes 
may be seen to interact with diverse other forms of contentious behaviour (Rasler 1996; Isaac 
and Christiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006). 
Importantly, there is evidence to suggest that organizational weakness increases the 
likelihood of actors to respond to short-term stimuli in the form of other protest. Conell and 
Cohn (1995: 372), in their work on strike waves, find that union organization “makes strikes less 
capable by themselves of provoking imitative striking" as, in such circumstances, union leaders 
are more likely to fulfill any date-setting function for protest. Further, Robertson (2004: 256) 
argues that when labour movements are weak, labour protest is likely to be "isolated and 
localized", often taking the form of wildcat strikes (see also Valenzuela 1989). Localized protests 
such as these are more spontaneous, lacking in formal leadership, and responsive to immediate 
signals of opportunity and threat (Snow and Moss 2014). Kurt Weyland, in his (2012) account of 
the cross-national diffusion of protest during the Arab Spring, advances a related claim that the 
speed with which protest spread from Tunisia to other countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa during this period can be partly attributed to organizational weakness in these countries. 
In the absence of such organization, the “cognitive heuristics" of protesters are short-termist and 
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overconfident, Weyland contends. Lacking "authoritative cues", in the form organized 
leaderships and movements, by which to judge the possibilities of contention, protesters thus rely 
on more immediate cues in the form of proximate protest. For our purposes, Egypt provides us 
with an ideal test case through which to examine the formative role of demonstration effects in 
patterning labour mobilization in conditions of organizational weakness. 
 
3.2 Economic conditions 
Conversely to the literature cited above, economic explanations of strikes stress exogenous 
conditions. A foundational argument from labour economics concerns fluctuations in the 
business cycle and the attendant impact on workers’ bargaining power. This argument, originally 
advanced by such figures as Charles Rist (1907) and Albert Rees (1952), has it that workers will 
strike for better wages when their bargaining power relative to management is increased as a 
consequence of upturns in the business cycle—normally proxied by unemployment rates 
(Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969). The mobilization context in Egypt was radically different from 
that forming the basis of the above business cycle explanations. The limited future 
generalizability of economic understandings of strikes to contexts outside of North America and 
Western Europe was, in fact, noted early on (Snyder 1975: 264; Cohn and Eaton 1989: 652). 
Unfortunately, as Robertson (2007: 2011) concludes, labour mobilization in non-democracies 
and outside of established representative trade union structures has received scant scholarly 
attention.4 
Robertson (2007) takes as his focus labour mobilization in the ‘hybrid’ regime of post-
Communist Russia, arguing that workers mobilize as a result of “political bargaining games" or 
in response to drastically worsening conditions. Of particular relevance is the suggestion that 
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where unions are absent or intended for control, labour protest can be seen, in a way similar to 
wildcat strikes, as responding to severe economic hardship (ibid.). Recent scholarship has also 
pointed to an association between economic breakdown and increased protest, including labour 
protest and strikes (Caren, Gaby, and Herrold 2017). Notably, such grievance-based theories of 
labour mobilization run counter to the bargaining models outlined above. Here, the argument is 
that a pronounced deterioration in economic conditions motivates labour mobilization, not 
labour’s strengthened position in relation to employers. 
A related body of scholarship stresses the macrostructural precipitants of protest cross-
nationally. In particular, scholars have pointed to aggregate-level trends in food prices as 
predictors of mobilization. While noting that there is no mechanistic relationship between such 
economic indicators and the outbreak of protest, Gunning and Baron, for example, identify rising 
world food prices as coinciding with both the cycle of contention beginning in Egypt in January 
2011 and the protests and strikes in the industrial region of Mahalla al-Kubra in 2008 (2013: 
133-35). A wider body of literature points to rising food prices globally as a predictor of protest 
waves cross-nationally (Sternberg 2012; Malik and Awadallah 2013; Hendrix and Haggard 
2015). These understandings share much with the economic hardship model of strikes outlined 
above. The timing of protest, this mode of analysis implies, is at least in part grievance-led, with 
the scale of mobilization associated with generalized downturns in economic conditions. 
 
3.3 Political opportunity 
While the majority of labour scholars treat strikes and labour protest as a discrete field of action 
separate from wider forms of protest, Shorter and Tilly observed that dramatic escalations of 
labour action in the form of strike waves often coincide with periods of political crisis (1974: ch. 
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5). This line of argument, extended by Sidney Tarrow, recommends that major upturns in labour 
protest in the form of strike waves be understood in relation to favourable openings in ‘political 
opportunity structures’ exemplified by such events as Roosevelt’s New Deal or the coming to 
power of the Popular Front in France. This, Tarrow argues, helps us to explain why many 
workers continued to strike during periods of economic downturn as changes in policy 
orientation or government signaled a newly propitiatory approach to labour relations and reduced 
chances of repression (2011: 162). 
The use of political opportunity in the literature is notoriously slippery (Meyer and 
Minkoff  2004). We follow Tarrow’s (2011: 163) definition of opportunities as “consistent—but 
not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment or of change in 
that environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting expectations for 
success or failure.” We anticipate changes in expectations of success, following McAdam's 
(1996) typology, to result from: openings in the institutionalized political system signaled by 
episodes of mass mobilization (e.g., the eighteen days of the 25th January Revolution and 
periods of resurgent mobilization like the events of Muhammad Mahmud Street); the emergence 
of elite allies (e.g., the installation of al-Bura’i as Labour Minister), and repression.5 In addition, 
at the time of elections, the literature would suggest that politics moves indoors as attention turns 
to electioneering and away from street-level mobilization (Oxhorn 1994; Hipsher 1996). 
The use of repression as a measure of closing opportunity requires further elaboration. 
Understood as the opposite of opportunity, repression discourages protest as it signals a reduced 
willingness on the part of authorities to hear protesters’ grievances, while the experience of 
repression increases the perceived or expected costs of mobilization on the part of contentious 
actors and bystanders, leading to demobilization. The question of the effects of repression on 
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collective protest is, however, a vexed one with both positive and negative associations between 
repression and mobilization accounted for in the empirical literature (see Earl 2011). 
Nonetheless, studies pointing to increased mobilization in the wake of repression often do so by 
stressing the organizational underpinnings of backlash (Francisco 2004) or ‘micromobilization’ 
processes wherein negative selective incentives function to encourage mobilization in the face of 
increased repression (Opp and Roehl 1990; Rasler 1996). Given the pervasive organizational 
weakness that characterized labour mobilization in Egypt, we might reasonably expect that 
opportunity-based explanations will likely provide a better fit for the case in hand. 
 
4 Data and method 
The foundational data source used for this paper is an event catalogue (Tilly 2002) hand coded 
from Egyptian newspaper sources comprising information on 4,912 protest events. In identifying 
protest events, we follow the definitional criteria provided by Horn and Tilly (1988) for 
contentious gatherings as “occasions on which at least ten or more persons assembled in a 
publicly-accessible place and either by word or deed made claims that would, if realized, affect 
the interests of some person or group outside their own number.” Following McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly (2001), we take a deliberately expansive view of labour mobilization, which is defined 
as any protest undertaken by persons making contentious claims on their employers. 
The principal source used was the Arabic-language Egyptian daily newspaper al-Masry al-Youm. 
Events were recorded for the period January 1 2011-January 1 2012. We focus on the first year 
of the transition, when Egyptians mobilized in the absence of any elected institutions. This 
opportunity structure was reconfigured in January 2012 with the election of an Islamist-
dominated parliament, in turn presaging a new stage in Egypt’s democratization, with organized 
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political Islam coming into conflict with the Mubarak-era judiciary and military junta. During 
periods of particularly high mobilization, e.g. the eighteen days of January 25-February 11 and 
the events of Muhammad Mahmoud Street, two other newspapers—al-Dostor and al-Shorouk—
were also coded in order best to combat underreporting and so-called ‘news hole’ effects (Oliver 
and Maney 2000).6 For each separate protest event on a given date, information was recorded on 
participation, location, repertoire (strike, demonstration, sit-in, occupation etc.), organizer, 
repression, and demands. In analyzing participation, we take lessons from Biggs (2016) who 
notes the inadequacy of event counts given the large variation in participation often seen from 
one event to the next. When precise figures were not given, protest reports would, as a matter of 
routine, report protest participation as tens, hundreds, thousands, or hundreds of thousands. On 
these occasions, we follow the coding convention outlined in the European Protest and Coercion 
Dataset, compiled by Ronald Francisco (n.d.).7 
[Figure 5 about here] 
The detail of reporting permits a high degree of spatial and temporal disaggregation when 
conducting the analysis. Egypt comprised, as of 2011, 27 governorates that in turn were 
subdivided into over three hundred census districts. The 330 census districts for which social 
context information is available to us are used in the analysis below. Each protest event was 
located in its census district. Figure 5 maps participation in labour protest across census districts. 
In total, of an original 4,925 entries in the event catalogue, 13 events had participation less than 
ten and were dropped from the analysis, 192 could not be located in a specific census district, 
while 36 protest events were in census districts for which no social context information was 
available, thus leaving n= 4,684. For the purposes of the analysis, a dataset was constructed that 
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included observations for each census district and day of 2011, subsequently aggregated by 
week, giving n= 17,160. 
4.1 Dependent variable 
For the main model, the dependent variable is participation in labour protest events and the unit 
of analysis is the district-week. An event is coded as a labour protest according to the multiple 
identifying criteria available in the event catalogue. If the repertoire is a strike, the event is 
automatically coded as labour. Otherwise, the event is identified as labour according to the 
recorded organizer (e.g., workers/employees) or demand (e.g., better wages/permanent 
contracts). The dependent variable is thus a count variable, for which negative binomial 
regression is used. This is preferred to Poisson regression for its ability to account for problems 
of overdispersion in the data by introducing an additional parameter that allows the variance to 
differ from the mean. We use random effects in order to account for the panel structure of the 
data. The exposure term is measured as the population employed in a given census district. We 
prefer random effects to fixed effects because of known problems with the validity of fixed 
effects count models (Hilbe 2011; Reuter and Robertson 2015). Subsequent models use fixed 
effects, and a number of alternative specifications of the headline dependent and independent 
variables, in order to provide a measure of robustness.  
 
4.2 Independent variables 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all independent variables (Table A.1 is the correlation 
matrix). To test for demonstration effects, three variables capturing different aspects of protest 
are entered at the district- and national-levels. These variables are counts of protest participation, 
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and are lagged by one week. The first variable measures the number of participants in labour 
protest events in nearby districts at t-1. The second protest variable measures participation in 
non-labour protest in nearby districts at t-1. Non-labour protest is defined as any protest that is 
not counted as labour and includes protest by activists, political parties or local residents. If other 
instances of contentious street-level mobilization provide a signal to workers that protest 
constitutes a legitimate and viable means of making claims, we should expect that both of these 
variables will have a positive effect on labour protest participation at time t. To measure the 
occurrence of labour and non-labour mobilization in neighbouring districts, we use a binary 
spatial weighting matrix that captures participation in nearby districts falling within 10km of the 
centroid of the target district. Here, we take lessons from recent scholarship on protest and 
violence, which have explicitly incorporated spatio-temporal lag terms to model the endogenous 
dynamics of contention (e.g. Osorio 2015; Aidt, Leon, and Satchell 2017).8 
The third protest variable measures participation in protests in Tahrir square at t-1. Tahrir 
square became the symbol of the 25th January Revolution and, over the course of 2011, the site 
of frequent large-scale protests, often held on Fridays. These protests received front-page 
coverage and represented key episodes in the timeline of the revolution. State security forces also 
made multiple attempts at clearing the square of protesters and occupiers in the aftermath of 
Mubarak’s ouster. In this sense, it became a status marker for the revolution, and continued 
mobilization in Tahrir could be understood as a signal that contentious collective action 
remained an accepted and prevalent mode of articulating grievances. We expect diminishing 
marginal returns from increased protest participation at t-1, and so these three protest 
participation variables are square rooted. Here, the differential effect of a protest of 1000 
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compared to a protest of 10 is likely to be large, whereas the effect of an increase in participation 
from 100,000 to 150,000 is likely negligible. 
Two economic indicators test for the effects of rising food prices and unemployment. For 
this, available data on quarterly unemployment rates and monthly food price inflation are used. 
Data for food inflation and unemployment rates were taken respectively from publicly available 
statistics provided by the Central Bank of Egypt (n.d.) and the Egyptian Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS, n.d.). Food inflation rates are measured as the 
percentage change in food prices in a given month compared to the same month in the previous 
year. The unemployment rate is calculated as the number of unemployed persons as a proportion 
of the total labour force. Both of these variables represent national aggregate measures. Food 
inflation rates in Egypt were positive and highly volatile throughout 2011, with a high of 21.66% 
in April and low of 8.67% in October. Unemployment rates increased by three per cent to 11.9% 
in the first quarter of 2011, and by another 0.5% in the last quarter. 
Dummy variables for salient subperiods are included to measure the effects of broad 
openings in opportunity. Two time periods of particular interest are the final week of the 25th 
January Revolution when workplaces were reopened in the context of mass protest and the 
Muhammad Mahmud protests of November 19-25. Including dummies for these periods gives us 
an idea of the character of labour mobilization and the opportunities to which it was responsive. 
The final week of the Revolution represented the most public fracturing of the state and a clear 
opportunity for workers to take advantage of a degraded repressive apparatus, after nearly a 
quarter of the police stations in the country were burnt down (Ketchley 2017). As for 
Muhammad Mahmud, the SCAF had shown itself throughout 2011 to be doggedly opposed to 
the demands of the labour movement, and mobilization against them presented workers with a 
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chance to strike back. Dummy variables coded 1 for the weeks falling inside these time periods 
are used. A third time period more specific to labour mobilization comes after the appointment in 
early-March of Ahmad Hasan al-Bura’i as Minister of Labour. A dummy variable coded 1 for 
the two weeks following al-Bura’i’s appointment is included to measure any effect. As noted 
above, however, the SCAF would follow up on such moves by introducing an anti-protest law 
two weeks later. A dummy for the two weeks following this move is also included, as is a 
dummy variable coded 1 for the period of the first elections (28 November onwards). 
Finally, to account for the effects of repression we include a national measure of 
participation in repressed protest events at t-1. The relatively small number of protest events 
repressed means it is not possible to differentiate between different forms of repression. Overall, 
398 events in the event catalogue were met with repression of some sort, and 42 of these were 
labour events. Of the repressed labour events, the majority involve the police or armed forces 
intervening to force the break up of an occupation or protest or to demand that a strike be called 
off. Events are coded 1 if the protest event is met with any form of force, which includes crowd 
control by army/police (including use of batons), use of tear gas, birdshot or live ammunition, 
and if arrests are made or protesters killed. Again, this variable is transformed to its square root. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
Two social context variables measuring the percentages employed in manufacturing and public 
administration in each census district are used as controls. The data for the social context 
controls are taken from the 2006 Population and Housing Census conducted by CAPMAS 
(2006). To account for the underlying distribution of the workforce, we measure the percentage 
in a district employed in manufacturing and public administration. These variables are intended 
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to capture the employment make-up of each census district and proxy for broad categories of 
blue- and white-collar work. The straightforward expectation is that areas with higher 
percentages employed in either type of work can expect to see more labour mobilization. Each 
governorate in Egypt has a census district that represents its administrative centre. A large 
number of labour protests were staged outside the main administrative buildings of these centres. 
As such, a square root distance term from the administrative centre for each census district is 
also included as a control. The expectation here is that, all else being equal, protest decreases the 
further away a census district is from the administrative centre. 
 
5 Results 
[Table 2 about here] 
The results are shown in Table 2. Models 1-5 employ negative binomial regression, with 
coefficients expressed as incidence rate ratios. Model 1 represents our headline model, while 
models 2-6 represent robustness checks of various sorts, the details of which are below. Turning 
our attention to Model 1, both labour and non-labour protest in nearby districts at t-1 are shown 
to have a significant positive association with the rate of labour protest participation in a district 
at time t. Table A.2 in the Appendix demonstrates how the strength of this association diminishes 
with distance. This points to preliminary evidence of the presence of demonstration effects. 
Crucially, these signals derive from both labour and non-labour protest, thus demonstrating the 
importance of viewing labour protest within a broader framework of contentious politics.  
Controlling for protest at the district-level and other contextual factors, increased protest 
in Tahrir Square at t-1 is also significantly positively associated with district-level labour protest 
at time t. This provides us with another indication that demonstration effects were in evidence 
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during the post-revolutionary protest wave that swept Egypt. Protest and occupations in Tahrir 
Square, which would frequently amass tens if not hundreds of thousands of people, provided an 
effective status marker for the progression of the post-revolutionary political transition. The 
occupation of Tahrir Square thus provided a signal that contentious collective action remained a 
legitimate and viable mode of claim-making. 
Both economic indicators show a significant negative association with labour protest. The 
direction of the effect for unemployment rates is consistent with bargaining power explanations 
of strike activity. Given the particularities of a post-revolutionary situation, however, it is worth 
qualifying this explanation. While workers’ assessments of their bargaining power relative to 
management may have deteriorated as a result of rising unemployment, it is also important to 
take into account prevailing political conditions during the transitional period. From early on in 
the post-revolutionary political process, workers were mobilizing in hostile circumstances and 
accused of imperiling the stability of Egypt. Rising unemployment rates will have only 
exacerbated the perception that workers were responsible for economic downturn, thus rendering 
conditions even less favourable to mobilization. A more surprising finding, given the emphasis 
in the literature on grievance-based explanations of protest, is the negative effect of food prices. 
This result suggests that, in the context of a protest wave, rising food prices can actually lead to a 
decline in protest. One explanation for this, consistent with the findings for the effects of 
unemployment, would have it that individuals are less disposed to protest and risk foregoing 
wages in tightened circumstances. 
All of the dummy variables for salient time periods point to significant effects. The final 
week of the 25th January Revolution and the installation of al-Bura’i as Labour Minister and his 
announcement of support for independent trade union organization both see a significant 
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increases in labour mobilization, while the announcement of anti-protest laws leads to a sizeable 
reduction in protest. The dummy for Muhammad Mahmud interestingly shows a negative effect 
in the wake of the Muhammad Mahmud protests, suggesting that far from mobilizing in 
solidarity in the wake of this opportunity, labour mobilization actually decreased. Muhammad 
Mahmud came at a time when independent labour organization and its representative in al-Bura’i 
were coming under attack from the ETUF executive supported by the SCAF. 9 This fact, 
combined with the absence of an organizational infrastructure capable of mobilizing Egyptian 
workers, helps explain the relative quiescence of workers during this major protest episode. 
Taken together, these opportunity dummies point to the chaotic and frequently uncertain 
mobilization context of a post-revolutionary situation. The dummy for the elections period 
demonstrates that this period is associated with a significant downturn in mobilization, when the 
exigencies of electioneering meant the energies of potential protesters were diverted elsewhere. 
The repression of protest at time t-1 also leads to a marked diminution in the rate of district-level 
participation in labour protest at time t. 
The social context controls behave largely as expected. There was greater mobilization in 
areas where a greater proportion of the population were employed in white-collar professions. 
There is also greater mobilization in areas with a higher percentage employed in manufacturing, 
though this result does not reach accepted levels of statistical significance in the main model. 
The geographical control for distance from the administrative centre indicates as expected that 
mobilization decreases the further away from the administrative centre.  
Models 2-6 provide several tests for the robustness of our findings. Model 2 demonstrates 
that our findings are robust to the use of fixed effects.10 A second test for robustness, shown in 
Model 3, uses a different measurement for the dependent variable. Our headline results outlined 
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above suggest that labour protest and, by extension, strikes interact with, and take cues from, 
contentious collective action undertaken by non-labour constituencies. One plausible objection to 
this argument would be that these findings pertain only to labour protest as a broad category that 
includes demonstrations, occupations, sit-ins etc., and not to strikes alone. To test this, we can 
replicate our analysis by confining attention to participation in strikes, as opposed to all labour 
protest. With the dependent variable set just to participation in strikes, the variables measuring 
nearby protest remain positive but lose significance, while the effect of Tahrir protest remains a 
substantive and significant predictor of participation in strikes, thus providing further evidence of 
cross-sectoral demonstration effects. In Model 4, we show that the results are robust to the use of 
different functional forms for the endogenous protest variables. Here, we use basic event counts 
for our dependent and independent variables in the place of participation and show that the 
effects of all our main explanatory variables remain unchanged. Model 5 includes only the 
endogenous protest variables, showing that these findings are robust to the absence of controls.  
Finally, in Model 6, we use an explicitly spatial model.11A global Moran's I test for 
spatial correlation reveals significant clustering (p=.033) in labour protest. Thus, in Model 6, we 
take lessons from recent advances in the spatial modelling of protest and violence (Osorio 2015; 
Aidt et al. 2017) and test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of a spatially 
autoregressive error term. Note that the coefficients in Model 6 are not exponentiated. 
Controlling for unobserved spatial dependencies in this way, the results are substantively 
unchanged.12 Here, we use a basic binary contiguity weighting matrix for the error term. An 
Appendix section (Tables A.3 and A.4) includes alternative specifications of the spatial OLS 
models, including fixed effects, alternative weighting matrices for the endogenous protest 
variables as well as for the error term (contiguity and inverse distance), unit-level temporal lag 
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controls, and spatially autoregressive panel errors. Again, results remain substantively 
unchanged. 
 
6 Discussion 
Before evaluating the implications of these results, a reflection on their limitations is in order. 
The robustness of the findings to the use of spatially autoregressive error models means we can 
have greater confidence that the observed associations between labour and non-labour protest are 
indicative of contagion rather than simply unobserved spatial correlation. Nonetheless, recent 
scholarship demonstrates the difficulties of parsing contagion and homophily between proximate 
spatial units (Shalizi and Thomas 2011), as well as the potential for unmeasured between-unit 
homophily to nullify any purported contagion effects (Braun and Koopmans 2010). As we note 
below, district-level social context measures were not available for some key measures. Further, 
lacking any obvious exogenous variation in potential contagion, as would be achieved in a quasi-
experimental setting (e.g., Kern 2011), or a valid instrument of the sort used in recent studies 
(e.g., Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013; Braun 2016), we cannot have complete confidence that 
we are accounting for unobserved confounders. What are the implications of this? One 
alternative interpretation of the results is that labour and non-labour protest behave similarly and 
respond to similar stimuli; a result still consistent with our overarching claim that, in conditions 
of organizational weakness, labour and non-labour protest should not be understood, contrary to 
much of the literature, as distinct forms of contention. It is worth also noting that while the 
effects of the endogenous spatio-temporal lag variables, which we interpret as contagion effects, 
may be confounded by spatial homophily, the consistent positive association of labour protest 
with (non-labour) protest at Tahrir square, and negative association with national protest 
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repression, does provide support for the argument that labour protest is responsive to both non-
local protest dynamics and broader openings and closings in the opportunity environment for 
protest generally. Nonetheless, given the difficulties of identifying contagion, our results remain 
necessarily tentative, and await further empirical verification in comparable cases of labour 
mobilization in contexts of organizational weakness. 
Unfortunately, there is also no data available on either the underlying membership of the 
ETUF, or the distribution of ETUF-controlled union committees across workplaces, and so we 
cannot account for unobserved differences in the organizational presence of the ETUF across the 
employed population.13 There is also no systematic data on the size or ownership of specific 
industries or the nature of labour processes where protest is recorded (e.g. Jansen et al. 2016). 
This is an acknowledged shortcoming, as previous studies have found that the onset and 
amplification of strike activity is partly conditioned by the concentration of the workforce, with 
larger and more concentrated workforces more likely to strike (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Dixon 
and Roscigno 2003). 
These limitations notwithstanding, the wave of protest that swept across Egypt in 2011 
has provided us with a unique chance to assess the dynamics of labour mobilization in conditions 
of organizational weakness. By analyzing the scale of labour mobilization at the district level, we 
have been able to assess mobilization dynamics across 330 districts over each week of 2011. 
The primary insight concerns the local- and national-level dynamics of interaction 
between labour protest and other forms of contention. Districts saw greater labour activism 
following both labour and non-labour contention in neighbouring areas. This suggests that 
demonstration effects provided signals of opportunity across diverse constituencies of protest. 
The mobilization of other protesters nearby provided a signal to unorganized workers that 
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conditions remained favourable for contentious collective action. These dynamics were, in turn, 
key determinants of temporal and regional variation in the incidence of labour mobilization. This 
finding points to the importance of understanding labour protest and strikes as part of a wider 
assemblage of contentious forms, and provides new insights into the dynamics of labour protest 
in conditions of organizational weakness. Current evidence points to the increased proclivity of 
workers to engage in imitative protest when organizationally weak. Egypt thus provides us with 
an ideal test case to examine the dynamics of labour mobilization in conditions of 
disorganization. And here we have suggestive evidence that, in the absence of a coherent 
organizational infrastructure, workers take their cues from the mobilization of visible others. By 
measuring protest over increasing distances, we also show how this effect dissipates. 
Our results also show that protest in Tahrir Square could inspire labour mobilization 
elsewhere. Here, the patterning of protest in Tahrir, which represented an effective status marker 
for the revolution, also provided a signal to workers that contentious collective action remained a 
legitimate mode of communicating grievances. Thus, signals of opportunity endogenous to 
protest were operating at a national- as well as a local-level. Levels of repression, on the other 
hand, had the opposite effect, with an increase in protest repression leading to a downturn in 
labour mobilization. Food inflation was also negatively associated with labour mobilization, 
which goes against what would be expected from the literature on food prices and protest. Here, 
our findings suggest that, as food prices increased, individuals were less willing to take demands 
to the street. Aggregate increases in unemployment also had a dampening effect on protest, 
consistent with the expectations of the literature. 
State level signals of opening and closing opportunity also predict labour activism in the 
Egyptian case, but not always in the way we would expect. Ekiert and Kubik claim that the 
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ephemeral situation in unstable transitory polities is better characterized as one of “unstructured 
opportunity” (Ekiert and Kubik 1998: 571), during which time clear signals of opportunity are 
hard to come by. The instability of the post-Mubarak polity meant that signals of opportunity 
originating from state officials during the democratic transition were often contradictory. Indeed, 
the political field in Egypt was a domain of competing institutional objectives, wherein newly 
elected leaders sympathetic to the labour movement were faced with countervailing pressures 
from the ruling military council. In such situations, consistent signals from elites at a state level 
were difficult to come by; oppositional hierarchies were in flux and the locus of power uncertain. 
Further, given the pervasive organizational weakness of the labour movement in Egypt, workers 
and their representatives in trade unions were clearly unable to set the agenda of the unfolding 
political process. When labour did make gains, most notably with the appointment of al-Bura’i as 
Labour Minister, these were frequently undermined by contrary pressures emanating from the 
SCAF. The increase and decrease in protest following such changeable signals is consistent with 
what we’d expect of a weakly organized labour force unable to set the agenda and mobilize in 
defence of its own interests, and tallies with the findings for the effects of repression. In the 
absence of any nationally competent organizational structure capable of channeling their 
energies in line with the unfolding political process, labour mobilization remained localized and 
labour-specific. In this, we see also how organizational weakness functions to limit the role of 
labour in processes of democratic breakthrough and consolidation. 
A brief discussion of independent trade unions is appropriate here. Two principal 
organizations aiming to establish trade union federations independent of the ETUF emerged in 
2011—the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) and the Egyptian 
Democratic Labor Council (EDLC). By the end of 2011, these claimed a combined membership 
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of over 3 million workers across approximately 400 unions. However, Beinin notes that these 
figures are almost certainly a gross exaggeration (2012: 17). Neither federation of unions had 
any presence in Egypt’s largest industries, and the ETUF’s membership of 3.8 million members 
was spread across more than 1,800 unions, meaning that the average workplace membership 
implied by the EFITU and EDLC figures of over 7,500 is not credible, especially given that the 
great majority of Egyptian workplaces do not count even in the tens of workers (ibid.: 11, 17). 
The paucity of information on labour actions conducted by these independent union federations 
and their actual presence in enterprises, beyond paper membership, again makes it difficult to 
measure their impact precisely. Matching available data on members of the EFITU to the event 
catalogue, however, we see that very few sectors outside the teachers, tax collectors and public 
transport workers who mobilized later on in 2011, had any affiliation with independent unions. 
Accounts of labour mobilization during 2011 also stress that often “[s]trike organisation... was 
broader than the membership of the independent unions" and involved a significant degree of 
worker self-organization even where paper membership of an independent union federation of 
some sort existed (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 226). Moreover, the efforts of the 
independent union federations, when not taken up by infighting, focused more on signing up new 
members and establishing an organizational infrastructure than they did on actually mobilizing 
workers (Beinin 2012: 16-17). Thus, while the lack of detailed data on independent union 
organization represents a drawback, it is likely not a significant shortcoming as labour 
mobilization during this period was generally characterized by self-organization outside of such 
overarching structures.14 
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7 Conclusions 
What of the generalizability of our findings? In some senses the Egyptian case is a peculiar one 
for the scale and frequency of protest during this period. For the sort of short-term proximate 
signals emphasized in this article to be relevant in other cases of labour mobilization we would 
need to see similarly high levels of mobilization. Intense periods of escalated mobilization do, 
however, punctuate the historical record and when this happens scholars often note the 
inadequacy of exogenous factors in explaining their dynamics (Oberschall 1989; Franzosi 1995: 
257-300; Kurzman 1996; Biggs 2003, 2005). Importantly, in these periods of “thickened 
history", Beissinger (2002: 27) observes, protest events, in the speed and frequency with which 
they occur, “come to constitute an increasingly significant part of their own causal structure.” 
Our analysis continues in this tradition of stressing the endogenous dynamics of mobilization in 
conditions of mass uprising. 
The Egyptian case does provide us with key insights into the dynamics of labour 
mobilization in conditions of organizational weakness, however. Our results indicate that 
mobilization of diverse actors nearby had a significant and substantively important effect on 
subsequent labour mobilization. In the absence of established organizations able to direct labour 
action and fulfil the date setting function normally carried out by trade unions, unorganized 
workers looked to the mobilization of others nearby, we argue, as signals of opportunity. 
A proper assessment of the impact of organizational weakness on mobilizing patterns 
would require a comparative cross-national study of labour mobilization, or more data on the 
organizational characteristics of Egyptian industries than is currently available. Nonetheless, the 
findings for the Egyptian case, where union organizations were largely absent or impotent, do 
indicate forms of labour protest that are consequently short-termist and responsive to local-level 
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stimuli. In this, our findings provide important insights into the transitional role of labour. A 
large body of scholarship is devoted to the central role of labour organizations in processes of 
democratization (Valenzuela 1989; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Collier and Mahoney 1997; 
Collier 1999). Despite the prevalence of state-controlled 'legacy' unions in transitional settings 
(Caraway 2008), little is known of the functioning of labour in such settings when 
organizationally weak. The patterning of labour mobilization seen in Egypt suggests that when 
labour lacks trade union organization during a transition away from authoritarian rule, it may be 
subsumed within the broader mobilization wave and sidelined from the unfolding political 
process regardless of how massive its mobilization.  
The effects of repression may also find explanation in the weak organizational 
underpinnings of labour mobilization. Most accounts of protest backlash stress the organizational 
foundations of resurgent mobilization in the wake of repression (Opp and Roehl 1990; Rasler 
1996; Francisco 2004). The Egyptian case, conversely, provides us with an example of sustained 
mobilization in the absence of organization. Repression, in such conditions, likely represented 
one of the few clear signals that conditions were no longer propitious for mobilization. 
Our findings also provide an important contribution to the literature on economic 
hardship that stresses the centrality of economic downturn to protest. In the case of labour 
mobilization, the association in the Egyptian case runs contrary to the expectations of this 
scholarship; rising food prices seem to suppress labour mobilization. Unemployment rates, 
consistent with the dominant literature, do seem to have a suppressant effect on labour protest. 
This is perhaps to be expected. Throughout the year, workers were mobilizing in hostile 
circumstances and their continued mobilization was touted as one the principal causes of 
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instability in the post-uprising period. Deteriorating economic conditions likely exacerbated the 
perception that conditions were not favourable to continued mobilization. 
More broadly, we see what is missed by focusing solely on grievances. The rich 
qualitative literature on the role of labour during the 25th January Revolution generally takes as 
its focal starting point the acceleration of neoliberal “structural adjustment" programmes from 
2004 onwards in Egypt. Of the 1,125 labour protests for which specific demands can be 
identified in the event catalogue, the vast majority pertain to wages, contracts, and management 
or ownership of a given industry.15 Thus, the general character of labour mobilization does 
indeed show signs of grievances linked to the neoliberal restructuring of preceding years, during 
which wages decreased, fixed-term contracts were withdrawn, and industries were privatized. 
Grievances, however, are of limited utility for explaining variation in activism and while 
structural preconditions for mobilization are of import, this focus often functions to the neglect 
of the where, when and how of contentious collective action.
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1 This figure combines our event data with the event data for 2010 to 2011 reported in 
Gunning and Baron (2013). The data for both periods derive from the same source—protest 
reports published in the Arabic-language Egyptian newspaper al-Masry al-Youm. Note that 
Gunning and Baron’s (2013) event catalogue ends on 1 January 2011. This leaves 
unexplained the role of labour mobilization during the 25th January Revolution and its 
aftermath. 
2 We use a minimal definition of national action to mean labour protest events involving the 
same set of actors (e.g., teachers or workers in the same industry) mobilizing in three or more 
governorates on the same day to advance the same or similar set of grievances. Protest events 
of this sort were also normally identified as cross-regional or national actions in the reporting 
itself. 
3 Here we follow the identifying criteria proposed by Shorter and Tilly (1974), for whom a 
strike wave is identified by any period in which the frequency of strikes in a given national 
unit exceeds the average of the previous five years by at least fifty per cent. 
4 Notable recent exceptions include Teitelbaum (2011); Teitelbaum and Robertson (2011); 
Agarwala (2013). Quantitative work on labour protest in the developing world is hampered 
by the unavailability of systematic union and strike data. Emmanuel Teitelbaum's "High 
Profile Strikes Dataset" (n.d.) represents one of the few attempts at overcoming this 
constraint.  
5 Tarrow makes the implicit distinction between what Meyer and Minkoff (2004) describe as 
‘structural’ and ‘signal’ variants of political opportunity. While the former include stable 
elements of political environments conducive to differing forms of mobilization cross-
nationally (e.g., Kitschelt 1986), the latter refer to proximate and changeable signals in the 
form of specific policies or political realignments. Here, opportunity is understood according 
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to the signal variant. McAdam also cites the "stability of elite alignments" as a measure of 
opportunity. We prefer to focus on the presence/absence of elite allies since the "stability" or 
otherwise of elite alignments during the tumultuous transitional period is beyond our ability 
properly to operationalize, but see also foonote 9. 
6 As Egypt’s largest private newspaper during this period, and one of the principle chroniclers 
of the 25th January Revolution and its aftermath, we found al-Masry al-Youm to be the most 
consistently reliable record of protest activity (see also Gunning and Baron 2013; Ketchley 
2017 who use the same source). In the period under study, Al-Dostor and al-Shorouk were 
Egypt’s other two leading private newspapers. The number of protests recorded in these 
newspapers compares extremely favorably with event catalogues derived from English-
language news media. To give an example: the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED), one of the most sophisticated cross-nation event datasets available to date, 
records 850 events in Egypt for 2011-12. Confining attention to protest events reduces this 
number to 654, equivalent to only 13 percent of our total sample. Our catalogue also records 
substantially more labour protests than data collected by Egyptian NGOs. Beinin (2013), for 
example, reports that there were nearly 1,400 labour protests in 2011, equivalent to around 60 
percent of our sample of labour events.   
7 Following Francisco (n.d.), “tens” were coded as “31”; “hundreds” were coded as “301”; 
“thousands” were coded as “3001”; and so forth. Rarely, no participation figures were 
offered. Triangulation with different sources suggested that this was almost always due to the 
small size of the protest, suggesting that low numbers were not considered sufficiently 
newsworthy to report. On these occasions, participation was imputed from the repertoire. 
Strikes, marches, and demonstrations were coded as “301”, occupations in public spaces were 
coded as “1001,”, while sit-ins and human chains were coded as ”31”. The same coding 
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conventions are employed in Ketchley (2017). We re-run our analysis using aggregate counts 
of events, to ensure that our findings are not sensitive to imputation of participation.  
8 The median distance between a centroid and that of its nearest neighbour is 8 km (the mean 
is 16 km). For the main analyses, we thus elected to use a buffer distance of 10km. As the 
size of the buffer increases, more protest is captured. If the centroid of a neighbouring district 
is within the buffer distance, protest in this district is captured. Protest within the home 
district is excluded. These variables were calculated using the Vincenty formula available in 
the geopy Python package. We assume that demonstration effects are affected by distance, 
and so we conduct separate analyses in which we vary the radius of the buffer from 2 km to 
20 km. 
9 One reading of this result, consistent with the third component of McAdam's four-party 
typology of opportunity cited above is that this period saw a destabilization of elite 
alignments, leading to a downturn in labour protest. 
10 It should be noted that the current statistical literature advises against the use of fixed 
effects negative binomial regression, as, currently formulated, it is not a true fixed effects 
model (see Hilbe 2011; Reuter and Robertston 2015). The fixed effects model drops rows 
with all zero values, which explains the reduction in observations and districts here. 
11 Model 6 and subsequent spatial OLS models in the Appendix were calculated using the 
spxtregress spatial modelling commands provided in STATA 15. The most up-to-date shape 
file obtainable for Egypt lacked coordinate information on 17 districts included in the main 
dataset, explaining the reduced number of districts in these analyses. In total, just 14 non-zero 
observations were lost as a result of this, with the highest participation in the dropped 
observations being 3150 (1 obs.), and second highest 1200 (1 obs.). 
12 Here, the dependent variable is transformed to its square root. The spatial OLS results are 
robust to alternative functional forms, including discrete event counts and cube root 
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transformations. Note that a log transformation is not viable given the large number of zeros 
in the dataset. The results are also robust to the addition of a simultaneous spatial lag of the 
dependent variable. 
13 Expectations relating to the effect of state-controlled unions on mobilization could run in 
two directions. A first sees that industries with an ETUF union committee had at least some 
form of (rather than no) union organization, even if it was ETUF-controlled, which could be 
supplanted and redirected to represent workers’ interests, thus leading to heightened chances 
of mobilization. This was notably the case for the massive strike in the Ghazl al-Mahalla 
textile factory of 2006 (Beinin and Duboc 2013; Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 97-124). 
Contrariwise, we know that ETUF union leaders often opposed strikes and invited sanctions 
on insubordinate workers, thereby potentially constraining protest. 
14 This is reflected in qualitative accounts of labour protest during and after 25 January, 
which emphasize the degree of spontaneity and self-organization involved. Alexander and 
Bassiouny comment that “[t]he [2011] strike wave was 'spontaneous' in the sense that it was 
mostly organic strike organisation within the workplace" and was partly an “instinctive 
reaction by hundreds of thousands of workers to the opening of an opportunity to settle 
accounts with their bosses and win concessions as a result of the crisis of the regime" (2014: 
203). Rather than being provided by a trade union structure, leadership seems to have come 
about in the process of contention itself. Beinin and Duboc cite one strike leader who 
commented that “[s]trike leaders... are created during the strikes. They are called natural 
leaders because they come from the ranks of the workers and the workers gather around 
them, spontaneously" (2015: 6). 
15 The categories of grievances were taken from Alexander and Bassiouny (2014: 212). 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Labour protest 59.797 687.211 0 40790 
Labour protest (√ , t-1, 10km) 7.412 22.544 0 235.187 
Nonlabour protest (√ , t-1, 10km) 25.192 100.815 0 1172.274 
Tahrir protest (√ , t-1) 185.283 265.489 0 1167.621 
Food inflation 15.806 4.398 8.67 21.66 
Unemployment rate 12 0.235 11.8 12.4 
Last days 0.019 0.137 0 1 
al-Bura’i 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Muhammad Mahmud 0.019 0.137 0 1 
Protest law 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Repression (√ , t-1) 82.099 141.776 0 703.223 
Elections 0.096 0.295 0 1 
% Manufacturing 10.96 8.973 0 58.708 
% Public admin. 9.819 5.122 1.203 32.977 
Distance from centre (√ , km) 5.495 5.042 0 30.329 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
Table 2: District-level labour protest participation 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2: 
Fixed 
effects 
Model 3: 
Strikes 
DV 
Model 4: 
Event 
DV/IVs 
Model 5: 
Reduced 
Model 6: 
OLS Spatial 
errors 
       
Labour (t-1) 1.009*** 1.009*** 1.001 1.042*** 1.001*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
Nonlabour (t-1) 1.001*** 1.001** 1.000 1.046*** 1.001*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) 
Tahrir (t-1) 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.002*** 1.063*** 1.001*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Food inflation 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.848*** 0.935*** - -0.125*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009)  (0.021) 
Unemployment rate 0.456*** 0.454*** 0.273*** 0.437*** - -1.014* 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.093) (0.088)  (0.445) 
Last days 1.825*** 1.831*** 2.133* 4.281*** - 2.554*** 
 (0.329) (0.330) (0.641) (0.835)  (0.492) 
al-Bura'i 2.177*** 2.179*** 3.068*** 2.216*** - 1.487*** 
 (0.263) (0.263) (0.741) (0.257)  (0.332) 
Muhammad Mahmud 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.000 0.125*** - -2.130*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.000) (0.063)  (0.486) 
Protest law 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.272 0.620* - -0.823* 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.196) (0.134)  (0.333) 
Repression (t-1) 0.999*** 0.999*** 1.000 0.974*** 0.998*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) 
Elections 0.259*** 0.259*** 0.115*** 0.235*** - -1.137*** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.051)  (0.271) 
% Manufacturing 1.006 1.000 1.023** 0.997 - 0.014 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.018) 
% Public admin. 1.109*** 1.098*** 1.132*** 1.080*** - 0.070* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.031) 
Distance from centre 0.919*** 0.893*** 0.967 0.951*** - -0.099** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.013)  (0.033) 
Spatial error - - - - - 0.097*** 
      (0.016) 
       
Observations 16,830 11,373 16,830 16,830 16,830 15,963 
Districts 330 223 330 330 330 313 
       
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Note: Models 1-5 employ negative binomial regression, with coefficients displayed as 
incidence rate ratios. Model 6 is a spatial OLS model, with coefficients unexponentiated. 
Figure 1: Protest frequency and participation in Egypt, 2010-2012. The red line records the onset of the 
25th January Revolution 
 
Figure 2: Labour protest frequency and participation, 21 January-11 February 2011 
 
 
Figure 3: Nationally-coordinated labour mobilization in Egypt, 2011-2012 
Figure 4: Weekly Labour protest and participation, 2011-2012 
 Figure 5: Labour protest participation by district, 2011-2012 
Appendix 
 
Table A.1 gives the correlation matrix. We include the spatial buffers of increasing radius width 
here, which are used in Table A.2.  In Models 1-6 of Table A.2, both labour and non-labour 
protest in nearby districts at t-1 are shown to have a significant positive effect on the rate of 
labour protest participation in a district at time t, and this effect diminishes with distance. This 
suggests that as the size of the area in which neighbouring protest is measured increases, the 
strength of the signal provided by any additional variation in such protest dissipates. This 
provides us with further evidence of the presence of demonstration effects. Crucially, these 
signals derive from both labour and non-labour protest, thus demonstrating the importance of 
viewing labour protest within a broader framework of contentious politics. 
Tables A.3 and A.4 display the results from the alternative specifications of the spatial 
OLS models. Model 1 estimates the model with random effects, and Model 2 with fixed effects. 
Model 3 adds unit-level temporal lag controls of labour protest (see e.g. Aidt et al. 2017), while 
Model 4 applies the same spatial autoregressive process to the panel-level random effects (Lee 
and Yu 2010). Results are substantively unchanged. In Models 1-4, the endogenous district-level 
protest participation variables are weighted with a binary contiguity matrix (as opposed to the 
binary 10km matrix used in the main analysis). In other words, only districts sharing a common 
border with the target district are captured here. Models 5 and 6 use an alternative weighting 
matrix for both the endogenous district-level protest variables and the spatial error term. Again, 
results are unchanged. 
Table A.1: Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 
(1) Labour protest 1.000                         
(2) Labour protest (t-1, 2km) 0.021 1.000                        
(3) Nonlabour protest (t-1, 2km) 0.014 0.458 1.000                       
(4) Labour protest (t-1, 5km) 0.038 0.561 0.293 1.000                      
(5) Nonlabour protest (t-1, 5km) 0.027 0.325 0.541 0.513 1.000                     
(6) Labour protest (t-1, 8km) 0.043 0.470 0.250 0.860 0.467 1.000                    
(7) Nonlabour protest (t-1, 8km) 0.035 0.287 0.465 0.496 0.864 0.540 1.000                   
(8) Labour protest (t-1, 10km) 0.048 0.426 0.234 0.796 0.436 0.939 0.511 1.000                  
(9) Nonlabour protest (t-1, 10km) 0.045 0.261 0.428 0.473 0.803 0.528 0.932 0.540 1.000                 
(10 )Labour protest (t-1, 15km) 0.066 0.382 0.214 0.700 0.392 0.832 0.458 0.902 0.492 1.000                
(11)Nonlabour protest (t-1, 15km) 0.057 0.221 0.364 0.411 0.684 0.488 0.803 0.517 0.868 0.548 1.000               
(12 )Labour protest (t-1, 20km) 0.067 0.336 0.188 0.629 0.349 0.759 0.415 0.829 0.447 0.931 0.512 1.000              
(13)Nonlabour protest (t-1, 20km) 0.054 0.200 0.336 0.378 0.632 0.460 0.744 0.493 0.804 0.532 0.931 0.544 1.000             
(14) Tahrir protest (t-1) 0.059 0.031 0.123 0.064 0.231 0.089 0.270 0.094 0.291 0.104 0.339 0.118 0.376 1.000            
(15) Food inflation -0.018 -0.018 0.026 -0.032 0.047 -0.033 0.056 -0.037 0.061 -0.045 0.072 -0.050 0.081 0.181 1.000           
(16) Unemployment rate -0.005 0.014 -0.007 0.022 -0.014 0.022 -0.016 0.021 -0.019 0.026 -0.022 0.026 -0.026 -0.046 -0.666 1.000          
(17) Last days 0.049 -0.019 0.061 -0.035 0.109 -0.041 0.131 -0.045 0.142 -0.050 0.164 -0.057 0.186 0.370 0.078 -0.060 1.000         
(18) al-Bura’i 0.018 0.032 0.011 0.046 0.016 0.052 0.020 0.054 0.020 0.063 0.025 0.075 0.027 0.091 0.216 -0.085 -0.028 1.000        
(19) Muhammad Mahmud 0.010 -0.006 0.016 -0.014 0.031 -0.019 0.036 -0.021 0.038 -0.024 0.046 -0.026 0.049 0.170 -0.135 0.239 -0.020 -0.028 1.000       
(20) Protest law -0.008 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.078 0.241 -0.128 -0.028 -0.040 -0.028 1.000      
(21) Repression (t-1) 0.005 0.012 0.067 0.018 0.126 0.017 0.149 0.011 0.161 0.010 0.186 0.003 0.209 0.498 0.051 0.041 0.307 -0.049 -0.040 -0.089 1.000     
(22) Elections -0.027 -0.013 -0.001 -0.034 0.002 -0.044 0.003 -0.050 0.002 -0.055 0.001 -0.067 0.001 0.034 -0.219 0.556 -0.046 -0.065 -0.046 -0.065 0.194 1.000    
(23) % Manufacturing 0.018 0.045 0.041 0.092 0.081 0.131 0.095 0.143 0.110 0.156 0.120 0.196 0.158 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 1.000   
(24) % Public admin. 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.001 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 -0.018 -0.009 -0.041 -0.038 -0.059 -0.051 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.129 1.000  
(25) Distance from centre -0.043 -0.108 -0.086 -0.172 -0.134 -0.187 -0.150 -0.187 -0.154 -0.187 -0.148 -0.187 -0.151 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.274 -0.160 1.000 
!
Table A.2: District-level labour protest participation: random effects negative binomial 
regression with incidence rate ratios with 2-20km spatial buffers 
VARIABLES Model 1: 
2km 
Model 2: 
5km 
Model 3: 
8km 
Model 4: 
10km 
Model 5: 
15km 
Model 6: 
20km 
Labour (t-1) 1.015*** 1.012*** 1.009*** 1.009*** 1.008*** 1.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Nonlabour (t-1) 1.002*** 1.001*** 1.001** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tahrir (t-1) 1.002*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Food inflation 0.933*** 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.932*** 0.933*** 0.933*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployment rate 0.510** 0.468*** 0.463*** 0.456*** 0.446*** 0.469*** 
 (0.107) (0.099) (0.098) (0.096) (0.094) (0.098) 
Last days 1.550* 1.789** 1.819*** 1.825*** 1.895*** 1.838*** 
 (0.276) (0.322) (0.328) (0.329) (0.343) (0.333) 
al-Bura’i 2.158*** 2.188*** 2.194*** 2.177*** 2.161*** 2.162*** 
 (0.261) (0.264) (0.265) (0.263) (0.261) (0.261) 
Muhammad Mahmud 0.096*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
 (0.049) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.056) 
Protest law 0.473*** 0.479*** 0.484*** 0.484*** 0.489** 0.490** 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107) 
Repression (t-1) 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Elections 0.237*** 0.243*** 0.257*** 0.259*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) 
% Manufacturing 1.018*** 1.009 1.007 1.006 1.005 1.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
% Public admin. 1.111*** 1.107*** 1.108*** 1.109*** 1.112*** 1.111*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Distance from centre 0.911*** 0.924*** 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.919*** 0.915*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Buffer 2km 5km 8km 10km 15km 20km 
Observations 16,830 16,830 16,830 16,830 16,830 16,830 
Districts 330 330 330 330 330 330 
Log likelihood -12807 -12790 -12807 -12802 -12797 -12812 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Table A.3: District-level labour protest participation: Spatial OLS models 
VARIABLES Model 1: RE 
contiguity 
Model 2: FE 
contiguity 
Model 3: RE contiguity 
and unit-level temp. lag 
Labour (t-1) 0.075*** 0.060** 0.051* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) 
Nonlabour (t-1) 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Tahrir (t-1) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Food inflation -0.128*** -0.128*** -0.121*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Unemployment rate -0.979* -0.965* -1.151** 
 (0.443) (0.445) (0.438) 
Last days 2.462*** 2.438*** 2.696*** 
 (0.491) (0.492) (0.486) 
al-Bura'i 1.489*** 1.498*** 1.286*** 
 (0.330) (0.331) (0.327) 
Muhammad Mahmud -2.121*** -2.159*** -1.569** 
 (0.485) (0.487) (0.479) 
Protest law -0.771* -0.779* -0.698* 
 (0.332) (0.333) (0.328) 
Repression (t-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Elections -1.142*** -1.163*** -0.768** 
 (0.270) (0.271) (0.267) 
% Manufacturing 0.018 0.000 0.015 
 (0.018) (0.000) (0.013) 
% Public admin. 0.070* 0.000 0.052* 
 (0.031) (0.000) (0.022) 
Distance from centre -0.104** 0.000 -0.069** 
 (0.033) (0.000) (0.023) 
Labour unit-level (t-1)   0.207*** 
   (0.008) 
Nonlabour unit-level (t-1)   0.030*** 
   (0.003) 
Spatial error 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.102*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
    
Observations 15,963 15,963 15,963 
Districts 313 313 313 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4: District-level labour protest participation: Spatial OLS models 
VARIABLES Model 4: RE contiguity 
SAR panel errors 
Model 5: RE 
inv. dist. 
Model 6: FE 
inv. dist. 
Labour (t-1) 0.070** 0.299*** 0.283*** 
 (0.022) (0.061) (0.064) 
Nonlabour (t-1) 0.033*** 0.062*** 0.063** 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.019) 
Tahrir (t-1) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Food inflation -0.128*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
Unemployment rate -0.972* -1.093* -1.087* 
 (0.445) (0.491) (0.491) 
Last days 2.449*** 2.263*** 2.236*** 
 (0.492) (0.555) (0.556) 
al-Bura'i 1.491*** 1.288*** 1.296*** 
 (0.331) (0.366) (0.366) 
Muhammad Mahmud -2.136*** -1.899*** -1.917*** 
 (0.487) (0.538) (0.539) 
Protest law -0.774* -0.618 -0.618 
 (0.333) (0.367) (0.367) 
Repression (t-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Elections -1.150*** -0.779** -0.789** 
 (0.271) (0.299) (0.300) 
% Manufacturing 0.017 0.008 0.000 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.000) 
% Public admin. 0.073* 0.073* 0.000 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.000) 
Distance from centre -0.103** -0.088** 0.000 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.000) 
    
Spatial error 0.096*** 0.394*** 0.395*** 
 (0.016) (0.046) (0.047) 
    
Observations 15,963 15,963 15,963 
Districts 313 313 313 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
